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ABSTRACT - Developmental Psychology seems to have come to an unifying theoretical framework which may make feasible 
to overcome the fragmentation so frequently referred to within the discipline. This is indicated by the widespread support 
being given to the systems approach, enriched by dialectic and contextual postulates. In this article, we briefly review the 
antecedents of this approach and explore its core concepts, indicating their roots and the precise way in which they are applied 
to developmental analyses today. We also examine the implications of the systems approach for developmental investigation, 
and its challenges.
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RESUMO - A Psicologia do Desenvolvimento parece ter chegado a uma estrutura teórica de trabalho que pode tornar possível 
vencer a barreira da fragmentação, frequentemente referida na disciplina. Isto pode ser verificado pelo vasto suporte dado a visão 
dos sistemas, enriquecido pelos postulados contextuais e dialéticos. Neste artigo, nós brevemente revisamos os antecedentes 
dessa abordagem e exploramos seus conceitos básicos (centrais), indicando suas origens e caminhos precisos nos quais eles 
são aplicados na análise do desenvolvimento nos dias de hoje. Nós também examinamos as implicações da visão sistêmica 
para investigação do desenvolvimento e seus desafios.
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Since its origins, Developmental Psychology has been 
characterized by the coexistence of theoretical perspectives, 
many of which are considered incompatible. This is the case 
with Piagetian and classical behavioral approaches, based 
respectively on organismic and mechanistic meta-theoretical 
assumptions (Overton & Ennis, 2006).
Developmental psychologists frequently denounce the 
fragmentation of the discipline and have called for a unify-
ing framework. Now may be a suitable moment to achieve 
this, judging by the support being given to the systems view, 
enriched by dialectic and contextual postulates. Important 
figures in current Developmental Psychology such as Bron-
fenbrenner, Gottlieb, Lerner, Magnusson and Thelen have 
defended the idea that this perspective may become a “new 
theoretical framework” to guide any future investigation 
and interpretation concerning development (Bronfenbrenner 
& Evans, 2000; Gottlieb, 1997; Lerner, 2006; Magnusson, 
1998; Thelen & Smith, 2006). Moreover, this vision appears 
to be coherent with the assumptions of the new “relational 
metatheory” proposed by Overton and Ennis (2006) to inte-
grate traditionally opposing worldviews.
The aim of the present work is to offer an introductory 
and synthetic approach to prevailing theoretical assumptions 
on Developmental Psychology. We start this article by briefly 
mentioning some core antecedents of the systemic view, 
then going on to analyze its core concepts. Basing on widely 
accepted recent system theories, we indicate their roots and 
the concrete way in which they are applied to developmental 
analysis today. The article closes with an analysis of general 
research implications and challenges of the systems view. 
Antecedents of the Modern Systems View
The systemic perspective of development appeared with 
the convergence of theoretical formulations from different 
disciplines; they shared a holistic view of the objects or phe-
nomena being dealt with. This meant affirming that they had 
a relationship of interdependence with their context, shaping 
a whole whose characteristics are not reducible to its com-
ponent parts (Fogel, 1993). In Developmental Psychology, 
the ideas of Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) had a particular impact. 
According to his field theory, conduct may not be considered 
independently from the field, or the context within which 
it occurs. Individuals and their world would join together 
in a close relationship named life space. It was represented 
as an ellipse, with the physical environment on its exterior 
(Lewin, 1998). 
In 1933 Bertalanffy published “Modern theories of 
development: An introduction to theoretical biology”. He 
was presenting his system theory as an alternative to the 
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mechanistic and vitalistic explanations of development. The 
author expressed this point as follows:
The solution to this antithesis in biology has to be sought by 
using an organismic or system theory of the organism which, on 
one hand, and as opposed to the machine theory, may discover 
that the essence of the organism lies in the harmony and co-
ordination between processes, and which on the other does not 
interpret this co-ordination as vitalism does, using a mystical 
entelechy, but instead by considering the imminent strengths of 
the living system itself. (pp. 177-178)
The term “system” referred to totalities that would 
construct themselves in a continual transactional process 
with their surroundings. Assuming the isomorphism of the 
systems that had been studied by different disciplines, Ber-
talanffy proposed a series of general principles. They may 
be applied to the development of systems, regardless of the 
type of elements that formed them or the forces involved. 
These principles included two that expressly incorporated 
the holistic perspective. The first one of complexity, referred 
to the interdependence between different parts of a system 
and between the system as a whole and its component parts. 
The other one concerned with the organization of the system, 
different from the organization of the parts separately. A 
third principle would characterize this global organization 
as a hierarchical pattern. Finally, another two principles 
would bring directionality to transactions between the parts 
of a system. According to the principle of self-stabilization, 
systems include mechanisms to maintain their state or tra-
jectory. According to the principle of equifinality, different 
transactions may lead to a limited number of patterns of 
organization (Bertalanffy, 1968).
Amongst the first applications of the systems theory in 
the field of Developmental Psychology, Heinz Werner’s 
work was of particular importance. He analyzed psycho-
logical processes in the context of the global organismic 
system. It was assumed to be formed by different parts 
such as locomotion, sight, and thought. They would go 
through phases of imbalance that would lead to structural 
reorganization, leading in turn to different types of behavior 
(Werner, 1948). As a guiding principle, Werner took the 
embryogenetic principle of orthogenesis and translated it 
to mental development. It was defined as a trajectory from 
a state of relative globality and lack of differentiation, lead-
ing towards a state of increased differentiation, articulation 
and hierarchical integration. 
From Werner up to modern times, systemic principles 
have been present in Developmental Psychology, and have 
integrated dialectic and contextualist proposals. For ex-
ample, Jean Piaget (1896-1980) described development as 
an adaptive process in which the biological and psychologi-
cal characteristics of the organism would interact with their 
environment. This process would facilitate the integration 
of the environment in the subject’s knowledge structures 
and the transformation of these structures by the action of 
the environment. A dialectic balance would be established 
between both sub-processes, respectively named assimilation 
and accommodation, which would lead to types of organiza-
tion of increasing complexity (Piaget, 1969). 
Lev Seminovitch Vygotsky (1896-1934) was also inspired 
by dialectic principles. Nevertheless, his main contribution to 
the systemic view would be the relevance given to contextual 
factors in the explanation of development, both at inter-indi-
vidual and sociocultural level. Vygotsky considered that the 
higher functions had their origins in the child’s relationship 
with more competent children or with adults. They were then 
reconstructed internally; he named this process internaliza-
tion. The author also pointed out that during development, 
subjects’ thoughts are conformed according to cultural norms. 
On the other hand, culture itself was considered by the author 
a product of the contributions made by individuals throughout 
successive generations (Vygotsky, 1960).
Systemic, dialectic and contextualist components have 
impregnated the developmental formulas of the followers of 
Piaget, Vygotsky and other influent contemporaries, such as 
the ecological and life-span theories (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; 
Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980) that are still valued today. 
Their points of convergence with the most recent systemic 
theories are referred to in the following section.
Basic Concepts of the Modern System View
The core assumption of the modern system perspective 
is still holistic; it states that the individual “develops and 
functions psychologically as an integrated organism. Matu-
rational, experiential and cultural contributions are fused in 
this ontogeny. Single aspects do not develop and function 
in isolation, and they should not be divorced from totality in 
analysis” (Magnusson & Cairns, 1996, p. 12). This idea ap-
pears to have firmly taken root in Developmental Psychology, 
as stated by Lerner (1998): “in contemporary developmental 
theories, the person is not biologized, psychologized or soci-
ologized. Rather the individual is ‘systemized’” (p. 1). Mod-
ern Developmental Psychology studies individuals within 
their context: the totality analyzed is the person-environment 
system (Lerner, 1998; Magnusson & Stattin, 2006).
In line with the systemic principles of complexity and 
organization, the person-environment system is considered 
to comprise multiple and integrated levels, organized in 
qualitatively different ways (Gottlieb, 1991; Lerner, 1985). 
In accordance with the systemic principle of hierarchical pat-
tern, each level of the system is considered simultaneously as 
a totality seen in relation to lower levels, and a subsystem in 
relation to higher levels (Magnusson & Stattin, 1998, 2006). 
It is also assumed that more complex levels adopt the laws 
of the simpler levels of which they are formed, and add new 
laws of their own.
The subsystems specified and/or analyzed by differ-
ent theories and investigations that fit the current system 
perspective form part of the organismic, psychological and 
environmental levels. However, they are treated with dif-
ferent degrees of detail, meaning we may establish a con-
tinuum that ranges from a psychobiological-developmental 
approach, to a developmental-contextual approach, using 
the terms introduced by Gottlieb (1997) and Lerner (1991) 
respectively. The psychobiological extreme includes ap-
proaches that differentiate sublevels within the biological 
level, and consider other levels in a more general fashion. 
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The contextual extreme comprises approaches that analyze 
the environment in more detail. The former includes ap-
proaches that adopt a comparative strategy, or that focus on 
exchanges of material or energy between subsystems. The 
latter tends to concentrate on the exchange of information 
between individuals, and consider both social and cognitive 
phenomena (The Carolina Consortium of Human Develop-
ment, 1996; Lerner, 1991).
For example, in the psychobiological extreme of the 
continuum of system approaches, we may situate the work 
of Greenough (1991). In an attempt to illustrate the many 
ways in which the organism’s exterior environment may in-
fluence genetic expression, the author identifies the following 
biological sublevels: DNA, cell nucleus, cytoplasm, cell and 
organ. He details interaction processes between levels that 
influence the expression of genes. Among other examples, 
the author refers to the role of visual experience in activat-
ing the gene that codes for tubilin, an integral protein in the 
axons and dendrites that support the functional connections 
of the visual system. In more recent studies, Greenough and 
co-workers reviewed experience effects on brain develop-
ment (see for example Dong & Greenough, 2004; Grossman 
et al., 2003; Kramer et al., 2004).
Gottlieb (1991, 1997) distinguished the biological levels 
of neural activity and genetic activity, a third level of behav-
ior and the last one formed by physical, social and cultural 
aspects of environment. The author aimed to demonstrate 
the integration of biological and social factors in the deter-
mination of inter-sensory development. He carried out an 
ingenious series of experiments manipulating the sensory 
experiences of developing birds and their capacity for neural 
and/or behavioral response to multi-modal information (Got-
tlieb, 1997; Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, 2006). He also 
explored the interaction between a particular genotype and 
rearing conditions as a determining factor for certain CNS 
deficits or psychopathological behaviors (Gottlieb, 2007; 
Gottlieb & Tucker, 2002)
The work of Magnusson concerning personality develop-
ment in adolescence (Magnusson, 1998) represents a mid-
way point in this psychobiological-contextual continuum. It 
includes the interdependence between hormonal, cognitive 
and affective function and the subject’s social environment. 
In particular, it has revealed the importance of the role played 
by the adolescent’s self-concept with regard to the association 
of early or late biological maturation during puberty with the 
indicators of the socialization process.
The work of Lerner and Bronfenbrenner is closer to the 
contextual extreme of the continuum of system approaches; 
they differentiate sublevels within the environmental level, 
while considering organismic and psychological levels with a 
lesser degree of detail. Lerner (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Lerner, 
1995a) described the biological, psychological, interpersonal, 
social, cultural, physical-ecological and historical compo-
nents of the subject’s changing developmental niche as neces-
sary in defining individual development. Bronfenbrenner’s 
ecological theory and its latest reformulation, the bioecologi-
cal model, also break down the environment into different 
levels, namely microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem and 
macrosystem (Bronfenbrenner, 1995; Bronfenbrenner & 
Morris, 1998; Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000).
Apart from the levels described, the most consistently 
outstanding feature of the different systemic approaches is 
the interdependence between intra- and inter-level processes 
of change. It is assumed that changes in an element at one 
level may respond to others that occur in other elements from 
the same or other levels, which in turn may affect these and/
or other elements (Lerner, 1985; Lerner, Skinner, & Sorell, 
1980). The influence some elements may have over others 
may extend either to higher or lower levels, or remain at the 
same level (Gottlieb, 1997). The relationships that exist be-
tween elements are considered as bidirectional or reciprocal, 
whereby one element that affects another may be influenced 
by it in turn. This type of relationship has been variously 
referred to as transaction (Baltes & Graf, 1997; Sameroff, 
1975, 1989; Scarr, 1982), coaction (Gottlieb, 1997; Got-
tlieb, et al., 2006), co-construction (Baltes, Lindenberger, & 
Staudinger, 2006; Kindermann & Valsiner, 1995; Valsiner, 
1996), co-genesis (Herbst, 1995; Valsiner, 1995), fusion 
(Lerner, 1989, 1998) or interaction (Bronfenbrenner & Mor-
ris, 1998; Lerner, 1978, 1985; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998). 
This final term frequently appears as dynamic interaction, 
referring to supplementary relational characteristics. Lerner 
(1978, 1985, 1989) distinguishes between a conventional 
version of the notion of interaction that he refers to as weak 
or static, and another that is strong or dynamic, and illustrates 
the difference by referring to the triadic relationships estab-
lished between the organism, environment and behavior. The 
conventional notion is present in explanations that impose the 
unidirectionality of a given relational vector. As an example, 
Lerner mentions the work of traditional behaviorists Bijou 
and Baer (1961) with regard to development. The use made 
by the authors of the term ‘interaction’ is weak, as the rela-
tionship is established between past experience (contained 
within the organism) and actual experience (given by the 
environment), which are qualitatively identical. They also 
reject the influence of the organism on the environment and 
the influence of the development produced by the interaction 
on the organism and the environment. Another example of 
the weak notion of interaction is included in Piagetian theory, 
which accepts the effect of the environment and individual 
behavior in facilitating or inhibiting development, but not that 
they affect the direction, sequence or quality of development. 
Dynamic interaction, unlike the previous versions, would 
mean the chance of a real change in the different related 
elements for all of the others (Lerner, 1985, 1989).
Magnusson and Stattin (1998, 2006) indicate that as well 
as reciprocity, dynamic interaction involves nonlinearity: the 
lack of obligation to suit a lineal function. This feature is con-
sidered as being a focal point of dynamic system theories, and 
is made operational by applying mathematical models used 
in thermodynamics (Fogel, King, & Shanker, 2008; Thelen, 
1989; Thelen & Smith, 2006; Van Geert, 1994).
This relationist perspective of developmental processes 
just described involves a relativist interpretation of its out-
comes, as these depend on the specific characteristics of the 
related components. For example, in the case of interactions 
between the organism and the environment, the implica-
tions of a particular organismic attribute for development 
will vary according to environmental conditions, whereby 
the influence of a particular type of environment will not be 
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the same on different organisms (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 
2000; Lerner, 1998, 2006). This type of reasoning is typical 
in contextualist perspectives, and has mainly been expressed 
in the importance given to the environmental aspects and 
transformations that these undergo as a source of intra- and 
inter-individual variability in development (Baltes, 1987; 
Kindermann & Valsiner, 1995; Lerner et al., 1980; Reese, 
1991). However, the most recent theoretical proposals have 
included the interest of the role played in diversity by or-
ganismic and psychological characteristics themselves, and 
have underlined their transitory nature (Baltes, Lindeberger, 
& Staudinger, 2006; Bronfenbrenner, 1995; Lerner, 1996; 
Magnusson, 1998). In any case, relativism means transcend-
ing the normative development and focusing on diversity. In 
the words of Lerner, Fisher and Weinberg (2000) “behavioral 
and social scientists have shown increasing appreciation of 
the diversity of patterns of individual and family develop-
ment that exist and comprise the range of human structural 
and functional characteristics” (p. 26). Also, considering 
that change is an intrinsic characteristic of developmental 
systems, the temporal dimension has become particularly 
important in present day developmental perspectives, as the 
results of development will vary according to changes in the 
person and environment throughout time (Bronfenbrenner 
& Morris, 1998, 2006; Gottlieb, 1991, 1996; Lerner, 1996; 
Magnusson, 1995).
The characteristics already covered in this article (ho-
lism, multi-level analysis, relationism and relativism) lead 
to a dispersive perspective of development, which accepts 
novelty as a possibility and denies pre-determinism, or the 
idea that development follows an unalterable or inevitable 
course. Novelty in ontogeny has usually been attributed 
either to instructions contained in the genetic code, or to the 
incorporation of information from the individual’s physical 
or social environment. In both cases, it is assumed that the 
emergent properties exist prior to their appearance in the 
developing person, and so are not really a novelty except 
in the individual (Dent-Read & Zukow-Goldring, 1997; 
Lautrey, 1998; Thelen, 1989). Systemic theories, however, 
adopt the principle of self-organization in order to explain 
novelty. According to this principle, reorganization occurs 
as a response to disturbances in the different levels of the 
system, leading to new structural and functional forms 
(Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998, 
2006; Sameroff, 1989). This proposal is connected with 
the dialectic principle of transformation of quantity into 
quality, which establishes that when the magnitude of 
the phenomenon’s intrinsic properties transcend certain 
limits, then quantitative change leads to a qualitative or 
structural reorganization of higher level. This leads to the 
appearance of a new phenomenon, controlled by a new set 
of laws (Hopkins & Butterworth, 1990; Wozniak, 1975). 
Self-organization is central to modern theories of non-lineal 
dynamic systems. As Van der Maas and Hopkins (1998) 
stated, “what is interesting about discontinuous shift in the 
collective variable of a non-linear system is that it is driven 
by a linear change in an existing (control) parameter without 
the addition of a new variable” (p. 2). As the individual 
makes changes to the characteristics of the environment 
during this process, which in turn lead to disturbances in the 
individual, an affirmation is made of the individual’s status 
as co-producer of their own development, and taking part 
in the socio-cultural change of the species (Baltes & Graff, 
1997; Lerner, 1995b; Magnusson, 1995; Sameroff, 1989). 
Therefore, the current systemic view opens the way to 
individuality in ontogeny, a feature that is reaffirmed by 
the purposeful nature attributed to human conduct (Brand-
städter, 2006; Lerner, 2006; Magnusson, 1998; Spencer et 
al., 2006; Valsiner, 2006). According to specific experiences 
in their environment and the needs, objectives and plans 
that arise in the person, development acquires a particular 
character. For Magnusson and Stattin (1998), this is a 
fundamental aspect that reveals a clear difference between 
the dynamic processes produced in the person-environment 
system and other holistic processes. We find an interesting 
application of the idea in the selection, optimization and 
compensation developmental model proposed by Baltes 
and Baltes (1990). The first term refers to the prioritiza-
tion of developmental goals. The second term refers to 
the acquisition of specific goal-related skills. The third 
term consists of the inversion of additional resources in 
response to some type of decline in goal-relevant means, 
with the aim of maintaining the desired level of functioning. 
Initially applied in the explanation of adulthood and aging, 
the model has recently been extended to adolescence by 
Lerner, Freund, DeStefanis and Haberlas (2001).
Dispersiveness, however, has limits in the systems 
view; these are found in the internal logic of the organism 
(Gollin, 1981; Sameroff, 1989; Scarr, 1982) and in the 
regularities of the environment (Dannefer & Perlmuter, 
1990; Dowd, 1990; Gottlieb, 1997; Valsiner, 1997). Firstly, 
development is interpreted as the adaptation of an individ-
ual to successive organismic (maturational) and environ-
mental changes that have their own internal organization, 
based around genetic and socio-cultural aspects (Baltes, 
1987; Cole, 1992; Gariépy, 1995; Gottlieb, 1991; Samer-
off, 1989). Secondly, in line with the systemic principle 
of self-stabilization, the organism is defended as tending 
to respond to any alterations produced by these changes 
with homeostatic or homerhetic processes. The former 
are intended to maintain states, and the latter to maintain 
sequences or trajectories (Sameroff, 1989; Magnusson 
& Cairns, 1996; Thelen, 1989, 2005). This tendency is 
generally attributed to the organism’s responsive capacity 
at any given moment - its plasticity - (Gottlieb, 1991; Got-
tlieb, Wahlsten, & Kickliter, 1998) or its impermeability 
to changes that may lead to the breakdown or destruction 
of the system, referred to as allostasis (Magnusson & Stat-
tin, 1998). Thirdly, it is considered that the environment 
delimits development, an effect which Gottlieb (1991) 
and Valsiner (1997) compare to the organizational role 
played by the genes, and which Sameroff (1989; Sameroff 
& Suomi, 1996) refers to as environtype and which Cole 
(1996) defines as prolepsis. 
In a recent study, Grossman et al. (2003) integrated this 
dual genetic and environmental regulating action, in an at-
tempt to explain the pathological deviations of normal psy-
chological development. To do so, they took Waddington’s 
metaphor of canalization and included non-genetic canaliz-
ing experiences that were absent in the original proposal. 
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In Gottlieb’s concept of probabilistic epigenesis (1998, 
2007) we find a clear reflection of systemic dispersivity and 
its limits. It affirms the emergent nature of the developmental 
process, and rejects that this process follows an unalterable 
course: this is conceived as probable in relation to the norma-
tive. Magnusson and Stattin (1998) echo this idea when they 
affirm that the processes of psychological development “are 
lawful but unpredictable” (p. 687).
The impossibility of precisely predicting developmental 
processes is not only the result of intra- and inter-individual 
variability and self-organization. It is also a consequence of 
the acceptance of a type of causality which until recently has 
been lacking in explanations of development. It is referred 
by Lerner (1996, 1998) as configurational or field causality 
and implies that none of the levels of the person-environment 
system, or elements in any level, are considered to be primor-
dial in causal terms. Magnusson and Stattin (1998) defined 
this idea in the following terms:
In the dynamic interaction process… what initiates a specific 
process and maintains it over time may vary. A psychological 
factor may start a biological process, which is then maintained 
by physiological factors… similarly, psychological factors can 
maintain a process that affects his or her own environment in 
many different ways directly and indirectly… the implication 
of this view is that the concepts of independent and dependent, 
and of predictors and criteria, lose the absolute meaning that 
they have in traditional research, which assumes unidirectional 
causality. What may function as a criterion or dependent vari-
able at a certain stage of a process may, at the next stage, serve 
as a predictor or independent variable (p. 702).
Also, configurational causality is relational; Kindermann 
and Valsiner (1995), for example, indicate that development 
is not determined by either individuals or their contexts, but 
instead by the complex interconnections that are produced 
between both. They defend that developmental psychologists 
should concentrate on these interconnections instead of each 
separate element. Similarly, Gottlieb (1996) states that “the 
behavioral (or organic, or neural) outcomes of development 
are the consequence of at least (at minimum) two specific 
components of coaction (e.g. person-person, organism-or-
ganism, organism-environment, cell-cell, nucleus-cytoplasm, 
sensory stimulation-sensory system, activity-motor behav-
ior). The cause of development – what makes development 
happen – is the relationship of the two components, not the 
components themselves.” (p. 69). Recently, Gottlieb and 
Tucker (2002) have reaffirmed the role of this type of rela-
tional or coactive causality in the explanation of normal and 
abnormal development.
Finally, Gottlieb (1996) refers directly to the component 
of novelty that is implicit in this type of causality. According 
to the author, “an important feature of developmental systems 
is that causality is often not ‘linear’ or straightforward. In 
developmental systems, the coaction of X or Y often produces 
W rather than more X or Y, or some variant of X or Y” (p. 74).
In conclusion, individual development is considered in 
modern systemic terms as a process in which new properties 
emerge as a result of dynamic interactions between the dif-
ferent levels of the person-environment system, and whose 
product is not certain but probable. More specifically, its 
main premises are:
1) That the object of study of Developmental Psychol-
ogy is the person-environment system. As the indi-
vidual develops as an integrated organism, contribu-
tions made to this process by maturation, experience 
or culture should not be analyzed separately.
2) The person-environment system is formed by 
multiple levels of organization that are qualitatively 
different and integrated. 
3) Dynamic interactions exist between the different 
levels, bidirectional transactions that have the abil-
ity to modify the elements which they act upon.
4) The effect of these transactions depends on the 
characteristics of the elements that are interacting, 
and the moment when this takes place.
5) Development does not follow an unalterable course: 
it responds to certain laws, but is unpredictable.
General Research Implications and  
Challenges of the Present Systems View
The conceptual framework described in developmental 
research has numerous implications. Firstly, systemic relativ-
ism is concerned with the external validity of investigation, 
and the possibility of generalizing the results (Lerner, 1995b; 
1998; Lerner et al., 1980; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998). 
Consequently, investigations that focus on individual and 
contextual diversity are more widely accepted than those 
concentrating on “typical” individuals and “standard envi-
ronments”. Magnusson (1998, 2000; Magnusson & Stattin, 
1998, 2006) emphasizes the benefits of longitudinal and 
cross-cultural designs aimed at extending the margins of 
generalizability imposed by the age of the subjects and the 
context analyzed. He also refers to the benefits of research 
focused on the person approach, as opposed to the traditional 
variable approach, and which, by discovering relational forms 
between the subsystems of the person and/or the environ-
ment, explains inter-individual and inter-contextual diversity. 
Lerner (1995b; Lerner, Fisher, & Sorell, 2000) indicates 
that studies that are intended to be explanatory and with 
“ecological” concerns, may take the shape of intervention 
policies and programs. As “experimental manipulations” in 
the “real world” they may provide data about person-context 
relations, and the plasticity that may be available to enhance 
human development.
In order to comprehend the reciprocal and dynamic nature 
of systemic relations, the most important factor is to adapt 
the investigative methods used to the characteristics of the 
variables being analyzed, avoiding any prejudice towards 
qualitative methods and to analyze both whole and molecular 
processes (Foster, & Kalil, 2008; Lerner, 2006; Lerner et al. 
1980; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998).
Systemic dispersivity involves abandoning prediction as 
the final goal of scientific research. According to Magnusson 
and Stattin (1998), this should be substituted by the compre-
hension and explanation of the processes that drive individual 
functioning and development. Bronfenbrenner and Morris 
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(1998, 2006) emphasize a type of investigation which, by 
adopting a discovery mode, would allow hypotheses to be 
created with sufficient explanatory power and precision to 
be able to be subjected to empirical testing. This basically 
consists of the “successive confrontations between theory 
and data leading toward the ultimate goal of being able to 
formulate hypotheses that both merit and are susceptible to 
scientific assessment in the verification mode” (Bronfen-
brenner & Morris, 2006, p. 802).
However, perhaps the most direct implication of the 
holistic-systemic perspective is the way in which it gives 
little consideration to studies analyzing isolated aspects of 
the person-environment system, and values multidimensional 
studies (Bronfenbrenner, 1995; Lerner, 1991, 1995b; 1998; 
Magnusson, 1995, 1998). These assessments are usually 
accompanied by the call for interdisciplinary collaboration 
in the effort to create a developmental science which, using 
the theoretical framework described, proposes investiga-
tions that consider the variables of the different systemic 
levels (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000; Cole, 1996; Lerner, 
2006; Magnusson, 1995). This call for collaboration which 
was present in the earliest work concerning the systemic 
perspective, the socio-cultural and life span movements, has 
gone from strength to strength, and has received institutional 
support. In particular, this included the Nobel Symposium of 
1994, which brought together specialists from the fields of 
medicine, biology and psychology to reflect on the possibili-
ties of contributing from within their respective disciplines 
to the comprehension of human development from a holistic 
and interactive perspective (Diamond, 2007; Magnusson & 
Cairns, 1996). We would also mention the appearance of the 
journal “Applied Developmental Science” edited by R.M. 
Lerner and C.B. Fisher, and the “Carolina Consortium on 
Human Development”, which forms part of the Develop-
mental Science Center at the University of North Carolina, 
under the auspices of R. B. Cairns, and with the participation 
of Elder, Gottlieb, Magnusson and Sameroff, among other 
scientists firmly dedicated to creating a new synthesis regard-
ing development (Cairns, Elder, & Costello, 1996; Gottlieb, 
1991; Magnusson, 1998; The Carolina Consortium on Human 
Development, 1996).
On the contrary to this organizational response, the 
practical application in research of the methodological 
proposals inspired by the systemic perspective has not been 
as widespread as we would expect, judging by publications 
in Developmental Psychology journals. Some years ago, 
Thelen (1989) complained that any theoretical systemic con-
siderations were usually relegated to the discussion section 
of articles, which paradoxically upheld the insufficiency of 
traditional explanations based on main and interaction ef-
fects. The author affirmed that the systemic vision included 
a series of major obstacles for empirical analysis, and that 
for this reason most investigators remained firmly attached to 
the “old ways”. In more moderate terms, Gottlieb (1991) de-
nounced the insensitivity of investigators concerning human 
diversity and contextual variation. In turn, Bronfenbrenner 
(1995) called for researchers to give as much consideration 
to personal variables as that which he had previously de-
manded for contextual variables. Recently, Valsiner (2006) 
still denounced that “most of child psychology continues to 
thrive on the basis of reduction of complexity to averaged 
data and considering these averages as established general 
norms” (p. 168).
The slow acceptance of the system view in empirical re-
search may be attributed to theoretical reasons and practical 
ones. Firstly, its suitability to interpretations of development 
that were previously incompatible may be interpreted as 
ambiguity, particularly with regard to its dispersive nature. 
Taken to extremes, adopting for example a perspective that 
Baltes (1987) refers to as radical contextualism, and Lerner 
and Kaufman (1985) as pure contextualism, the dispersive-
ness of the model may lead to a concept of development that 
is quite random.
The limits suggested for dispersiveness (the internal 
logic of the organism and regularities of the environment) 
are equally ambiguous, although it would be unreasonable to 
expect much precision in general theories about development. 
However, this does mean that investigators have to make 
their own decisions on where the limits are in each specific 
developmental phenomenon under study.
As regarding to more clearly methodological concerns, 
the systemic model is eclectic, yet tremendously demand-
ing. It does not reject the use of any type of design or 
technique, but places emphasis on the study of the dif-
ferent person-environment levels, and the consideration 
of interaction between them. This is almost certainly an 
impossible task in its strictest sense. Criticism resulting 
from this matter from Plomin, Cronbach and Gergen was 
contested by Magnusson and Stattin (1998), who stated 
that acceptance of the systemic model does not imply that 
the complete person-environment system has to be studied 
in every investigation. Instead, researchers should simply 
make sure that the level of complexity of the phenomenon 
studied is made explicit, with the plans for their work de-
signed around a systemic analysis based on the observation 
of the phenomenon in a specific level. Using the systemic 
model also guarantees a reference to a common space for 
scientific concepts when interpreting the results. In the 
same line, Witherington and Margett (2009) argue that 
“any empirical investigation of development necessarily 
compromise the complexity of the system as a whole by 
analyzing only some of the myriad of relationships that 
go toward establishing the whole. Studies of development 
involve choosing a viable – and therefore limited – set of 
relationships in a system to study.” (p. 255). 
Magnusson and Stattin’s (1998) and Witherington and 
Margett’s (2009) comments take some of the pressure 
off of researchers faced with something as ambitious as 
the systemic model. However, we would also mention 
one final cause for concern: the emphasis that has been 
placed on relativism. As the model accepts any possibility 
in the determination of development and its products, the 
applicability of the results from investigations becomes 
increasingly less reliable, and converts the intervention into 
a type of experiment. Without denying the transitory nature 
of our knowledge and of intervention strategies based on 
this knowledge, the formulation of the systemic model is 
extreme enough to create a feeling of despondency amongst 
developmental psychologists interested in the applied per-
spective of Developmental Psychology.
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We do not consider these controversial points as limita-
tions, but instead as challenges to be met. As Magnusson 
and Stattin (1998) stated, the complexity of the systemic 
model corresponds to the complexity of the object of study 
in our discipline, and this is something that should not be 
overlooked.
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